

**INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**87-753**

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT: (Optional)**

Command and Control Inspection

**OS REGISTRY**
**16 SEP 1987**
**FROM**

 Office of the Inspector General  
 6E18 Headquarters

**EXTENSION**
**NO.**

1-1-AJD-CR

**DATE**

15 September 1987

**TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)**
**DATE**
**OFFICER'S INITIALS**
**COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)**
**RECEIVED**
**FORWARDED**

1. Director of Security

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

87-753

15 SEP 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security  
Director of Finance  
Director of Logistics  
Director of Medical Services  
Director of Communications  
Director of Personnel

FROM:

Office of the Inspector General

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SUBJECT: Command and Control Inspection

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from the IG to the Deputy Directors. On 14 September we met with Bill Donnelly and in that session he recommended that we also meet with you to get your views. I or one of the other team members will be contacting your office to get on your calendar.

Attachment:  
As stated

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All portions of this document  
are classified SECRET

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## COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. Scope and Methodology: We will review apparent or perceived weaknesses in CIA's command and control systems that have caused or contributed to major flaps or problems in the past. We will evaluate our current preventive posture and recommend improvements if possible.
2. Background: Major flaps in recent years have involved little or no violation of law, but have continued to feed adverse perceptions about CIA; e.g. we are:

Out of control (or no one is in charge)  
Too responsive to tasking  
Involved in illegal or immoral activity  
Not always objective or "cooking the books"  
Bungling and incompetent

Moreover, such perceptions have undermined our relations with our oversight committees in Congress and severely damaged the relationship of trust necessary for effective oversight. This could lead to Congressionally mandated restraints that could significantly constrict the DCI's operating authorities.

### II. GENERIC PROBLEMS: (These will be illustrated by specific cases as appropriate)

#### 1. Ground rules:

Unclear or imprecise, often caused by failure to seek or difficulty in getting policy or legal rulings from appropriate authority  
Not understood, or in some cases, not known by employees  
Even when known and understood, ignored or deliberately broken  
Perceived unfairness in enforcement, e.g., senior officers who break the rules are merely reprimanded or permitted to retire early

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## 2. Communications:

Failing to pass information both up and down the chain of command  
Passing information or orders orally without subsequently creating a formal record  
Overcompartmentation leading to failure to involve experts at lower levels or in other Directorates  
Failing properly to vet tasking received from outside the Agency

## 3. Accountability and Responsibility:

Diffuse or fragmented authority, often caused by the involvement of more than one component in a Directorate or by involvement of more than one Directorate (the infamous "who's in charge" problem)  
Abdication of responsibility by senior management in substantive or operational matters resulting in overdelegation of authority to less senior officers

## 4. Failure to Follow the Chain of Command:

Senior managers tasking of lower level officers without reference to their superiors can result in:  
-- Management inability to ensure that tasking considers all elements of a problem  
-- Tasking not consonant with rules  
Makes assessing responsibility for failure or non-compliance difficult or impossible except at lowest level

# III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 1. Guidelines, Communication, and Compliance Issues:

Are improvements needed in our regulations, policies, procedures and/or compliance system? How can we ensure that all employees understand the basic ground rules? Can any workable way be found to ensure that sensitive or unusual guidance and tasking are recorded properly? Do we need to place auditors as well as compliance officers in the large covert action task forces? Is the IG process working? Does IG follow-up need to be regularized? Does the IG need to have more authority to ensure that recommendations are implemented whenever possible?

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2. Accountability and Management Issues:

Can anything more be done to increase employee and management sensitivity to operations or judgments that make us vulnerable to the adverse perceptions cited above? Should we institute a Review Group composed of the most senior Agency officers to review and approve high risk or especially sensitive collection operations? Should the Executive Committee play a more active role in managing the Agency? How can we ensure that highly compartmented, sensitive operations are properly staffed, reviewed, and approved? Do we need a more regularized continuing review process?

3. Perception Issues:

Can anything more be done to broaden and strengthen our constituency in Congress and to improve external perceptions of the Agency? How can we ensure that activities are reviewed with the perceptions of outsiders in mind--recognizing that if our activities can be misinterpreted, they will be. For example, should the Agency ever be seen to be a proponent of not notifying the Congress of Presidential Findings? What guidelines should be developed regarding reporting sensitive operations that do not require Findings?

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